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ARTICLES

THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT RETREATS FROM
PROTECTING TEXAS STUDENTS
ALBERT KAUFFMAN*

This Article criticizes the 2016 Texas Supreme Court school finance decision, the latest of seven decisions startingin 1989, for its disregardof both
the record in the case and the realities of the Texas Constitution and Texas
politics. The Article also focuses on how standardsfor reviewing legislation have changed and the Texas Supreme Court's irrational and unfounded retreat to the "money doesn't make a difference" theory of school
finance. Finally, the Article recommends a return to an objective, comprehensible, enforceable and constitutional system of review, and concludes
with a prayer for holdings that recognize the inequities of the past.
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INTRODUCTION

The Texas Supreme Court has now fully retreated from a powerful line
of previous Texas Supreme Court decisions protecting the rights of public
school students and low-wealth districts.' Returning to Texas history's
dual system of poor districts and wealthy districts, the Court removed
itself from its constitutional role as a vital ingredient in progressing toward school finance equity and adequacy and has instead regressed to a
dual school system in Texas that is divided between poor and wealthy
districts.2 This regression becomes evident by analyzing seven major

1. See Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 833, 840
(Tex. 2016) (upholding the current school finance regime despite the argument it violated
the adequacy and suitability requirements of Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas
Constitution).
2. See id. ("[O]ur judicial responsibility is not to second-guess or micromanage Texas
education policy . . . . Despite the imperfections of the current school funding regime, it
meets minimum constitutional requirements.").
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school finance decisions: 3 (1) Edgewood Independent School District v.
Kirby (Edgewood I);4 (2) Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby
(Edgewood II);' (3) Carrollton-FarmersBranch Independent School District v. Edgewood Independent School District (Edgewood III);6 (4)
Edgewood Independent School District v. Meno (Edgewood IV);7 (5)
West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District v. Alanis
(Edgewood V); 8 (6) Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District (Edgewood VI);' and (7) Morath v. Texas Taxpayer
and Student Fairness Coalition (Edgewood VII)."o
The retreat in Morath/Edgewood VIP was presaged in four Texas Supreme Court cases dating back to 1992.12 Only Edgewood I and II, which
were decided in 1989 and 1991 respectively, 3 adhered to the Texas Constitution's demands that the state create an efficient system of school finance; indeed, at the time, the Texas Supreme Court stood as the final
14
guarantor of the rights of students in low-wealth districts.
The Texas Supreme Court's power to declare the constitutionality of
the state's school finance system has served as a great equalizer over the
legislature's tendency to underfund public schools while benefitting

3. To simplify the discussion, this Article employs the terms Edgewood I-Edgewood
VII to denote the seven major school finance opinions issued by the Texas Supreme Court.
4. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
5. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood II), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991).
6. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Edgewood III), 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992).
7. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995).
8. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alanis (Edgewood V), 107 S.W.3d 558

(Tex. 2003).
9. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. (Edgewood VI), 176 S.W.3d

746 (Tex. 2005).
10. Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal. (Edgewood VII), 490 S.W.3d
826 (Tex. 2016).
11. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2016).
12. See Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d 746, 753 (Tex. 2005) (noting how the Texas Constitution states it is "the duty of the Legislature to provide public education," while the judiciary role is limited to a review of constitutional issues) (internal quotations omitted);
Edgewood V, 107 S.W.3d 558, 564 (Tex. 2003) (emphasizing the legislature has the "sole
right to decide how to meet the standards" of the constitution); Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d
717, 726 (Tex. 1995) (stating that the court does not dictate how the legislature should act);
Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d 489, 522 (Tex. 1992) (noting the duty to provide an efficient
system of free public schools is bestowed upon the legislature by the Texas Constitution).
13. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.

1989).
14. See Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at
the public school finance system had not
Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989)
remedy is long overdue. The legislature

491 (affirming the district court's conclusion that
changed to comply with the Texas Constitution);
("However, let there be no misunderstanding. A
must take immediate action.").
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wealthy school districts." Edgewood I and II thus led to quantum leaps in
the quality and efficiency of Texas's school finance system.1 6 Unfortunately, history has shown that Texas rarely moves toward fairness and
equality for its population unless federal or state courts force the legislature to address the issue and take strong, sometimes unpopular action.17
For example, courts have effectively forced Texas to change its laws to be
more equitable and in line with the U.S. Constitution in the following areas: the rights of undocumented children to public education,"
the rights of juveniles in detention, 19 voting rights,20 prisoners'
rights,2 1 school desegregation, 2 2 bilingual education,2 3 public hous-

15. See Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826, 844 (Tex. 2016) (recognizing the 700-to-I ratio
of wealth per student found in Edgewood I had been lowered to 28-to-1 due to the legislative response to Edgewood III).
16. Albert H. Kauffman, The Texas School Finance Litigation Saga: Great Progress,
Then Near Death by a Thousand Cuts, 40 Sr. MARY'S L.J. 511, 513, 537 (2008).
17. See e.g., Ellen Williams, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Education,49 SMU L. REV.
901, 902 (1996) (asserting that the Texas legislature felt burdened by court order to implement school finance changes); Michael Wines, Texas Agrees to Soften Voter ID Law After
Court Order, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/us/texasagrees-to-soften-voter-id-law-after-court-order.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/7TLN-884C]
(stressing how it took a court order for the Texas legislature to change its discriminatory
voting laws).

18. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 593 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th
Cir. 1980), affd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that a Texas statute barring undocumented
children from public school based solely on their status as an undocumented immigrant
violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
19. See Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 172 (E.D. Tex. 1973) (stating that the
lack of educational instruction in Texas prisons failed to meet Texas's constitutional
requirements).
20. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 755 (1973) (upholding the district court's
order requiring dissolution of the multimember districts in Bexar and Dallas counties due
to the historical political discrimination imposed upon Mexican-Americans and African-Americans in those counties).

21. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1277, 1288, 1300 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated in partand amended in partby,
688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding Texas prisons to be overcrowded and lacking security
in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
22. See United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D. Tex. 1970), affd, 447

F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971) (relying on Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), which held
that "the creation, maintenance and perpetuation of racially discriminatory district lineswhether for the purpose of elections or school attendance-is constitutionally improper").
23. See United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 434 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 680 F.2d
356 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding the state of Texas failed to take "appropriate action" to meet
the language difficulties encountered by Spanish speaking schools in violation of the Equal
Educational Opportunities Act).
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ing, 2 4 public health, 25 mental health, 26 and equality in grand jury
proceedings.2 7
Morath/Edgewood VII is the latest of seven Texas Supreme Court decisions examining the state constitutionality of Texas's school finance system. 2 8 This article will analyze the test for constitutionality framed in the
Morath/Edgewood VII decision, the Court's inappropriate reliance on
fifty-year-old studies on the connection between funding and achievement in public schools, and it will recommend a test for the constitutionality of the Texas school finance system that will provide long-term
29
protection for students and low-wealth school districts.
The test for whether the Texas school finance system is constitutional
under the Texas Constitution is based on a consideration of the system's
30
Yet, it is
efficiency, adequacy, suitability, equality, and tax structure.
naive to think the Texas Supreme Court will ever fully embrace a finding
In
that the Texas school finance system is inadequate or unsuitable.
fact, the Texas Supreme Court has enforced the Texas Constitution's proscription of a statewide ad valorem tax to benefit wealthy districts, the
constituents of which chafe at their inability to provide more educational
funds to their own students than what is available to students in all other
districts. 3 2 In Texas, the "financial efficiency test," which is based in eq-

24. See Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1052 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (holding that the
Department of Housing and Urban Development's funding, regulation, and assistance of
local public housing authority was an unconstitutional support of segregation).
25. See Frew v. Gilbert, 109 F. Supp. 2d 579, 585, 595 n.20 (E.D. Tex. 2000), vacated
sub nom. Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'd in part sub non. Frew v.
Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004) (holding Texas violated several provisions of a 1996 Consent
Decree, the purpose of which was to enhance over one million Medicaid Early Screening,
Diagnosis and Training program (EPSDT) recipients' access to health care and to foster
the improved use of health care services by Texas EPSDT recipients).
26. See Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 98 F.R.D. 11 (E.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 710 F.2d
1040, 1042 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that the district court certified a class action lawsuit
challenging the adequacy of conditions, care, and habilitation at Texas institutions for the
mentally disabled).
27. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (holding it unconstitutional to try a
person indicted by a grand jury in which membership of that grand jury purposefully excluded those of the defendant's race).
28. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2016).
29. See infra Part VII.
30. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826, 845 (Tex. 2016). "The financial efficiency doctrine
requires a rough equality of access to district funding . . . . Its aim is equality of opportunity, not equality of results." Id. at 862.
31. See id. at 845 ("The Court has never held the [school finance] system constitutionally inadequate, unsuitable, or 'qualitatively' inefficient under [A]rticle VII, [S]ection 1.").
32. See id. (stating the Texas Supreme Court has twice held the school finance system
unconstitutional under Article VIII, Section 1-e of the Texas Constitution because the
system effectively imposed a statewide ad valorem tax); Kauffman, supra note 16, at 544
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uity, is the only test that ensures both a long-term guarantee of equality
in the system and enforceability by the courts. 3 3
Although several state supreme courts have found their respective
state school finance systems inadequate, 3 4 and either directly or indirectly
required their respective legislatures to invest more funds in public
schools,35 my personal study and experience with Texas courts leads me
to conclude that such will never occur in Texas. 3 6 The anti-tax and anticourt involvement movements are simply too robust to enable a Texas
Supreme Court, whatever its political composition, to enforce standards
requiring the legislature or school districts to place sufficiently more
funds into the school finance system.
The test the Texas Supreme Court used went overboard in reinforcing
the presumption that the Texas school finance system is constitutional."
To be sure, the Court has gone beyond that test to create a "multiple
escape hatch" test in which the Court relies largely on state discretion,
lack of arbitrariness, reasonableness, and deference to uphold the constitutionality of Texas's school finance system.3 9 This complex web of escape hatches for the legislature is further exacerbated by the Texas

(discussing Edgewood V, wherein four wealthy districts argued the various tax requirements in the school finance system was an unconstitutional statewide property tax).
33. See Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 845 (stating the efficiency standard of Article
VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution consists of a "quantitative" component, which is
also referred to as "financial efficiency").
34. See e.g., Gannon v. Kansas, 372 P.3d 1181, 1204 (Kan. 2016) (holding the Kansas
school funding system to be unconstitutional); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. South Carolina,
767 S.E.2d 157, 180 (S.C. 2014) (holding the South Carolina school funding method unconstitutional); McCleary v. Washington, 269 P.3d 227, 261 (Wash. 2012) (holding that the
state of Washington failed to meet its constitutional obligation to fund schools fairly). See
generally Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Education Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1500 (2007) (discussing historical patterns in
education equity challenges).
35. See e.g., Gannon, 372 P.3d at 1204 (affording the legislature time to cure funding
disparities before issuing a judicial mandate).
36. See Kauffman, supra note 16, at 579 ("[T]he [Texas Supreme Court] has so weakened its own jurisprudence that the [Edgewood] cases will be of little use to the legislature
in understanding its constitutional duties").
37. See Douglas S. Reed, Court-OrderedSchool Finance Equalization:JudicialActivism and Democratic Opposition, DEV. SCH. FIN. 99-100 (1996), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs97/
97535g.pdf (illustrating a "gradual and modest" decrease in school financing inequities,
"despite the Texas Supreme Court's deep and repeated involvement").
38. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717, 728-29 (Tex. 1995) (upholding the presumption of constitutionality of S.B. 7, which failed to provide poorer school district's an efficient public school system).
39. See infra Parts III and IV.
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Supreme Court standard that efficiency and equality must only meet the
minimum level of adequacy. 40
By deferring to the legislature's definition of adequacy and its decisions
regarding whether equal access to an adequate school finance system exists, the Court has doubled down on how deferential it is to the legislature. Moreover, the Court applies this "kid-glove, "escape hatch"
approach to the legislature's decisions on curriculum, testing, accreditation, and the general diffusion of knowledge. 4 ' The Court also applies
the same set of deferential standards to the legislature's decisions on the
degree of adequacy and equity necessary to achieve an accredited education level. 42
The test of constitutionality set forth in Edgewood I and Edgewood II
was clear and enforceable, and it set an understandable and attainable
standard for the legislature.4 3 Conversely, the present system effectively
allows the legislature near complete deference to determine the constitutionality of its school finance decisions while leaving the decision of
whether the legislature's authority has been properly examined and
respected in the hands of the Texas Supreme Court."4
One particularly negative aspect of the MorathlEdgewood VII decision
45
is the Court's reliance on the Coleman Report. In 1966, The Coleman
Report incorrectly found that additional school funding has little effect
on the achievement of students. 46 The study has been roundly criticized
and holds no weight in light of the more sophisticated, complete, and
objective analyses of the funding-achievement connection in school fi-

40. See Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826, 853 (Tex. 2016) (noting that financial efficiency is more relevant to educational financial analysis than adequacy).
41. Id. at 849.
42. Id.
43. The Edgewood I standard for financial efficiency requires the following:
[A] direct and close correlation between a district's tax effort and the educational
resources available to it; in other words, districts must have substantially equal access
to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort. Children who live in poor
districts and children who live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially equal
opportunity to have access to educational funds.
Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
44. See Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 886 (reiterating that education policy making is
the responsibility of the legislature, not the courts, and further, that the judicial role is not
to second-guess whether the legislature's system is optimal).
45. Id. at 851-52, 859-60; JAMES S. COLEMAN HiT AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNil, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS (1966), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/

ED012275.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CDM-LNUN].
46. See Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 852 (discussing how the Coleman Report has
been followed by hundreds of studies that reached conflicting conclusions).
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nance systems.47 Nevertheless, the Texas Supreme Court relied heavily
on the outdated Coleman Report to support its tired and rebuffed argument that additional funding does not lead to additional student achievement.48 Indeed, the Court has retreated from its own strong holdings in
Edgewood I and Edgewood II that increased funding does lead to additional opportunities for students.4 9
To clarify this issue and directly rebut the Texas Supreme Court's assumptions on funding, this Article will briefly summarize the present understanding of the connection between funding and achievement in
public schools. This Article will also delineate and defend the proper test
for determining the constitutionality of the Texas public school finance
system. That is, Texas should adhere to a standard that grants all school
districts equal access to public school funds. Further, the funding system
should use up-to-date criteria for determining the needs of every student
and every school district and employ a formula directing sufficient funds
to accommodate educational requirements.
For the last seventy years, Texas has kept reliable data on the funding
available to Texas public schools."o Such data shows wealthy school districts have significant advantages in funding and access to funding, while
poor school districts have continuous disadvantages in funding and access
to funding." Such a disparity in access and funding negatively impacts
Texas educational standards because school districts with the least access
to funds often are tasked with educating students with the greatest

47. See, e.g., Warren Simmons, Looking Back on the 50th Anniversary of the Coleman
Report, ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.annenberginstitute.org/bloglop-ed-looking-back-50th-anniversary-coleman-report
[https://perma.cc/2UT
P-9CZW] (arguing Coleman's conclusions are flawed because he ignored the consequences
of poverty and the negative impact on student achievement of unequal funding for school
materials and facilities).
48. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 860.
49. Compare Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989) ("The amount of money
spent on a student's education has a real and meaningful impact on the educational opportunity offered that student."), with Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 860 (quoting Edgewood
VI, 176 S.W.3d 746, 788 (Tex. 2005)) ("[M]ore money does not guarantee better schools or
more educated students.") (emphasis added).
50. See Patricia A. Fry, Texas School Finance: The Incompatibility of Property Taxation and Quality Education, 56 TEx. L. REv. 253. 254 (1978) (discussing the Gilmer-Aikin
Bill of 1949, which essentially created a program of state-funded education for Texas and
began data collection of the state school system).
51. See How Do We Finance Our Schools?, PBS (Sept. 5, 2008), http://www.pbs.org/
wnet/wherewestand/reports/finance/how-do-we-fund-our-schools/?p=197 [https://perma.cc/
87CV-AMJG] (explaining that Texas's school funding gap is amongst the largest in the
nation and that the quality of a school's equipment and buildings depend on the wealth of
the community surrounding it).
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needs.52 As such, this Article recommends that the legislature provide
sufficient funding to the school finance system to, at the very least, bring
Texas up to national standards of public school funding.
II.

THE TEXAS SCHOOL FINANCE DECISIONs HAVE MOVED FROM
CLARITY AND ENFORCEABILITY TO ARBITRARINESS
AND UNENFORCEABILITY

This Part briefly summarizes two important constitutional provisions
and the seven Texas Supreme Court school finance cases, focusing only
on the basic constitutional tests developed in each decision and the extent
to which each decision modified the tests used in prior decisions. There
are two crucial provisions in the Texas Constitution for interpreting the
school finance cases: (1) the education clause, and (2) the ad valorem tax
clause, which prohibits state-wide property taxes.
The education clause is found in Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas
Constitution and reads as follows:
A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation
of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the
Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for
the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free
schools.53
Almost every word of this constitutional provision has been an issue in
the Texas school finance cases, but clearly the phrases "general diffusion
of knowledge," "duty of the Legislature," "establish and make suitable
provision," and especially "efficient system" have been the most litigated
to date.5 4 In the context of Texas Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding
the protection of liberty from attack by state law, the impact of the school
55
finance system on the "liberties" of the people is especially important.
The ad valorem clause was added to the Texas Constitution in 1968 and
is found in Article VIII, Section 1-e.5 6 Unlike the education clause, it is
straightforward and unambiguous: it states, "No State ad valorem taxes
shall be levied upon any property within this State,"" language the Court

52. See Kauffman, supra note 16, at 523 (explaining how low-wealth schools are at a
unique performance disadvantage compared to wealthy schools).
53. Tex. Const. art VII, § 1.
54. See, e.g., Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989) (discussing the constitutional mandate by which the legislature is to provide an education system of public free
schools).
55. See infra Part IV(B).

56. Tex. Const. art. VIII,
57. Id.

§ 1-e.
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utilized in Edgewood I, Edgewood II, Edgewood III, and Edgewood IV to
find the school finance system in question unconstitutional.s
A.

Edgewood I (1989)

In Edgewood I, the Texas Supreme Court analyzed the Texas Constitution and developed a test focused on the existence of substantially equal
access. 59 Specifically, the Court held:
There must be a direct and close correlation between a district's tax
effort and the educational resources available to it; in other words,
districts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues per
pupil at similar levels of tax effort. Children who live in poor districts and children who live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially equal opportunity to have access to educational funds.6 0
The Edgewood I court also concluded, "The amount of money spent on
a student's education has a real and meaningful impact on the educational opportunity offered that student." 61 This holding was a direct repudiation of the court of appeals' decision.62 In that case, the court of
appeals relied heavily on the analysis in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,63 which upheld the Texas school system as constitutional despite the challenges brought under the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.64 Moreover, the Edgewood I decision was con-

58. See Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d 746, 754 (Tex. 2005) ("We now hold ...
that local
ad valorem taxes [primarily used by local school districts for funding] have become a state
property tax in violation of [the Texas Constitution]."); Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d 489, 500
(Tex. 1992) (agreeing with the appellants' contention that the taxes imposed by the Texas
Senate's proposed school financing bill amounted to a state ad valorem tax in violation of
the Texas Constitution); Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491, 498 (Tex. 1991) (contending that
school financing system in question is too dependent on local ad valorem taxes and does
not draw revenue from all property at a substantially similar rate); Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d
at 398 (holding that local districts' heavy reliance on ad valorem taxes for funding violated
the Texas Constitution).
59. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 397.

60. Id.
61. Id. at 393.
62. Id., rev'g, Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App.-Aus-

tin 1988).
63. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
64. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973) (rejecting a
strict scrutiny analysis that is afforded under Equal Protection Clause because the Court
found "neither the suspect-classification [nor] the fundamental-interest analysis persua-

sive"); Kirby, 761 S.W.2d 859, rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391, 862, 864 (1989).
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sistent with a large group of state Supreme Court cases that found their
65
respective state school financing systems to be inequitable.
B.

Edgewood 11 (1991)

In response to Edgewood I, the Texas legislature enacted Senate Bill 1
(S.B. 1);66 however, low-wealth districts again challenged the new school
financing system.67 After the district court struck down S.B. 1's school
68
In Edgewood
financing system as unconstitutional, the state appealed.
in
it
promulgated
test
the
strengthened
Court
Supreme
II, the Texas
disa
between
correlation
close
and
"direct
a
by
requiring
I
Edgewood
69
Importrict's tax effort and the educational resources available to it."
property
in
difference
the
analyzed
II
specifically
Edgewood
tantly,
70
The Edgewood II
wealth between wealthy and poor school districts.
in addressto
consider
legislature
the
for
remedies
suggested
also
opinion
ing the constitutional issues surrounding the creation of a school finance
Such remedies
system that provides equal access to educational funds.
72
included consolidating school districts and tax bases.
Additionally, the Edgewood II court bemoaned the insidious opportunity gaps between rich and poor districts,73 the arbitrary boundaries of
the 1,052 existing school districts,7 4 the wide gap between tax bases
among the districts,75 and the fact that 170,000 students in the wealthiest
districts were supported by local revenues drawn from the same tax base
as 1 million students in the poorest districts.7 6 Consequently, the Court
found that S.B. 1's school financing system violated the Texas Constitution as a matter of law.7 Unfortunately, the Edgewood II saga was far

65. See, e.g., DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Ark. 1983) (affirming that
an Arkansas financing system violated equal protection provisions found in the Arkansas
Constitution); Brigham v. Vermont, 692 A.2d 384, 384 (Vt. 1997) (holding Vermont's system of financing public education unconstitutional and requiring the state to ensure substantial equality of educational opportunity); Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler,
606 P.2d 310, 311 (Wyo. 1980) (holding Wyoming's state financing system of public schools
unconstitutional because it failed to afford equal protection).
66. Act of June 7, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1.
67. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. 1991).
68. Id.

69. Id. at 397.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 497.
Id.
Id. at 496.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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from over, as the Court granted the state's motion for rehearing and retreated from its previous decision."
i.

Edgewood Ha (1991)

On rehearing, and facing intense public scrutiny, the Texas Supreme
Court began reversing course from equity back to continued superior
funding for wealthy districts.7 9 The rehearing opinion, which I describe
as Edgewood Ha, relied on parts of the Texas Constitution the Court essentially ignored in its previous opinions.o Specifically, the rehearing
opinion focused on analyzing the proscription against statewide ad
valorem taxation under Article VIII, Section 1-e," and compared it with
the constitutional provision mandating that local tax revenue is not subject to statewide recapture. 82 However, the most damaging holding in the
Edgewood Ha rehearing by far was the following: "Once the [legislature
provides an efficient system in compliance with Article VII, Section 1, it
may, so long as efficiency is maintained, authorize local school districts to
supplement their educational resources if local property owners approve
an additional local property tax.""
The Court's holding on rehearing was apparently in response to the
great public uproar over possible recapture funds from wealthy districts. 84
C.

Edgewood III (1993)

After the Edgewood II decision, the legislature effectively disregarded
the Edgewood Ha rehearing ruling and enacted a new bill that required
local school districts to share their tax revenue with other districts in the
state-a system referred to as "recapture." 85

78. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood Ha), 804 S.W.2d 499, 499-508
(Tex. 1991) (op. on reh'g). The Edgewood II case is published as two opinions in one. The
first part is the decision holding that the 1990 school finance system laid out by S.B. 1 was
unconstitutional. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 491-99. The second part of the opinion is
the "Opinion on Motion for Rehearing," which is an opinion by five of the justices in
response to the state's Motion for Rehearing. Edgewood Ha, 804 S.W.2d at 499-500.
79. Edgewood Ha, 804 S.W.2d at 499-508.
80. See Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 499 (op. on motion for reh'g) (focusing on Article
VIII, Section 1-e and Article VII Section 3 of the Texas Constitution, whereas Article VII,
Section 1 led to the holdings of unconstitutionality in Edgewood I and Edgewood II).
81. Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 1-e.
82. Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3.
83. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491, 500 (Tex. 1991) (op. on motion for reh'g).
84. Justice Doggett's dissent made this point clearly and attached newspaper articles
from powerful education leaders to support his view. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 506-08
(Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting).
85. See Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d 489, 498 (Tex. 1992) (determining the constitutionality of the legislature's "recapture plan").
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The newly enacted Senate Bill 351 (S.B. 351) created county education
districts (CEDs), whose "sole function [was] to levy, collect, and distribute property taxes." 86 In response, wealthy school districts immediately attacked S.B. 351." Completing its turn away from equity and
efficiency toward the rights of wealthy districts, the court held that the
CEDs amounted to an unconstitutional statewide ad valorem tax." The
Edgewood III opinion was also an important development in terms of the
Texas Supreme Court's school finance jurisprudence because Justice
Cornyn, the author of the Edgewood IV opinion, wrote that the cases
should be considered from an adequacy point of view rather than equity
89
point of view.
D.

Edgewood IV (1995)

In 1993, after the Texas Supreme Court struck down the CEDs, the
legislature passed Senate Bill 7 (S.B. 7)," which created the basic structure still used today. 91 S.B. 7 required the wealthiest districts to share
some of their tax wealth with other districts in the state. 92 Further, the
93
Texas Supreme Court upheld S.B. 7 in 1995's Edgewood IV decision.
In Edgewood IV, the Court clearly showed the inconsistency and weakness of its school finance jurisprudence. It did so by allowing a $600 per
student gap between wealthy and poor districts and reinforcing the standard that, as long as the system was reasonably equalized at a certain
level of adequacy, inequalities above that funding level would not violate
the Texas Constitution. 94 Realizing the Court's school finance jurisprudence was moving toward inequity and inadequacy, Justice Spector wrote
a powerful dissenting opinion in which she emphasized the stark change
86. Act of April 11, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 20, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 407,
amended by Act of May 27, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 391, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1475, 1478;
Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 498.
87. See Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 493 (explaining numerous school districts chal-

lenged the constitutionality of S.B. 351's "recapture" system and the CEDs it created);
JosE A. CARDISNAS, TEXAS SCHooL. FINANCE REFORM, AN IDRA PERSPECTIVE 319 (1997)
(stating a group of the state's wealthiest school districts brought a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of S.B. 351 a mere three weeks after its adoption).
88. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 500.
89. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717, 730 (Tex. 1995) (emphasis added); Kauffman,
supra note 16, at 537-39.
90. Act of May 28, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 347, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1479 repealed
by Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 260 § 58(1), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2207, 2498.
91. See Kauffman, supra note 16, at 540 (stating S.B. 7 provided, with a few modifications, the school finance system in effect until 2006).
92. Act of May 28, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 347, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1479 repealed
by Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 260 § 58(1), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2207, 2498
93. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 725.
94. Id. at 731.
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in the standard the Court applied and noted the tragic movement away
from equity standards laid out in Edgewood I and in Edgewood JJ.95
E.

Edgewood V (2003)

In 2001, after six years of unchallenged school finance changes, the
wealthy districts again attacked the school finance system by arguing that
the plan's requirement they tax at near-maximum rates effectively created an unconstitutional statewide property tax.9 After the district court
summarily dismissed this argument, the Texas Supreme Court supported
the wealthy districts' theory and remanded the case to the district court
for a trial on those issues.
F.

Edgewood VI (2005)

The remand in Edgewood V led to the district court's hearing and opinion in Edgewood VI, by far the most comprehensive consideration of the
Texas school finance system up to that date.98 The wealthy districts argued that the tax rate caps created a system without "meaningful discretion" and therefore amounted to a statewide ad valorem tax.99
Additionally, mid-wealth and low-wealth districts joined the wealthy districts in claiming the school finance system was inadequate. 10 Consequently, Edgewood VI was the first school finance case in Texas to litigate
the adequacy standard fully.10 1
Low wealth districts argued that the funding system was not only inadequate but also prejudicial to the low-wealth districts because they had
significantly less funds available than wealthy and mid-level districts.10 2
Unsurprisingly, the wealthy districts did not join in the equity portion of
the litigation.103

95. Id. at 766-70 (Spector, J., dissenting).
96. Edgewood V, 107 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex. 2003).
97. Id. at 585.
98. See Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d 746, 751-54 (Tex. 2005) (rehearing arguments to
determine whether the school finance system failed to meet the three standards of the
education clause of Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution and also whether the
local ad valorem taxes at issue amounted to a statewide ad valorem tax expressly prohibited by Article VIII, Section 1-e of the Texas Constitution).
99. Id. at 751.
100. See id. ("Our responsibility in this case is limited to determining whether the
public education system is "adequate" in the constitutional sense . . . .").
101. See generally Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826, 842-50 (Tex. 2016) (summarizing
all the previous school finance cases and concluding this case was the first to address the
adequacy argument).
102. Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d at 772.
103. Id. at 751.
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After allowing the parties to litigate the equity and adequacy issues
thoroughly, the district court determined the system was both inadequate
and inequitable and found that the funding structure was an unconstitutional statewide property tax.104 Texas immediately appealed, thereby
providing the Texas Supreme Court a genuine opportunity to develop its
05
jurisprudence on the entire area of school finance in a single opinion.'
A brief description of the differences between the "adequacy" and "equity" theories is necessary here. The equity theory requires school districts to have the same or similar access to funds for education, regardless
of the general level of education expenditures in the state." The adequacy theory, on the other hand, requires the state and localities to maintain adequate standards for education and to fund all school districts to
meet this level of adequacy. 107 Furthermore, these standards do not necessarily overlap: that is, under the equity standard, a school financing system can achieve equity without providing an adequate education for
students, and, under the adequacy standard, it can provide more funding
to some districts than others as long as all districts have "adequate"
funds.1 0 s In fact, in his Edgewood II dissent Justice Cornyn argued that
providing all districts with $1,000 per student met the equity standard
even though much more funding was necessary for an adequate education.10 This argument is reductio ad absurdum.1"o The problem has
never been about having a perfectly equitable system at a low achievement level; the problem is that the system is very inequitable in that
lower- and middle-income districts have inequitable access to adequate
funding.

104. Id. at 753-54, 771.
105. See id. at 751-54 (addressing the attacks on the school finance system through
the education clause and the ad valorem clause of the Texas Constitution).
106. Id. at 753; Equity vs. Adequacy, INTERCULTURAL DEV. RES. Ass'N (Oct. 24,
2016), http://www.idra.org/education-policy/fair-funding-common-good/know-the-issue/equity-vs-adequacy [https://perma.cc/QJR5-UA6W] [hereinafter Equity vs. Adequacy].
107. Equity vs. Adequacy, supra note 106.
108. See Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d 489, 527 (Tex. 1992) (Cornyn, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("[T]he Constitution does not require equalization of funds between students
across the state. Further, implicit in the concept of an efficient school system is the idea

that the output of the system should meet certain minimum standards-it should provide a
minimally "adequate" education.").
109. See id. at 525-26 ("[I]t is fundamentally important that the legislature be mindful
of all of the elements of the efficiency standard we announced in Edgewood I. That standard deals with more than money, it mandates educational results.").
110. An argument is reductio ad absurdum when, if taken to its logical conclusion, it
results in an absurd notion. Reductio ad absurdum, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reductio%20ad %20absurdum [https://perma.cc/WX2D-DRX
N] (last visited April 6, 2017).
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'

In Edgewood VI,1 11 the Texas Supreme Court essentially rewrote its
entire jurisprudence in the school finance area and created, out of whole
cloth, a complex evaluation system for Texas school finance laws. The
new standards set forth what appear to be objective standards yet grant
the legislature nearly unfettered discretion on how to meet them.112 in
discussing the appropriate standard of review for allegations of unconstitutionality of the finance system the court stated, "Whether the statutory
provisions creating the public school system are arbitrary and therefore
unconstitutional is a question of law.""'3 The Court went on to describe
the new test as follows: "If the [l]egislature's choices are informed by
guiding rules and principles properly related to public education-that is,
if the choices are not arbitrary-then the system does not violate the constitutional provision."1 1 4 Moreover, the Court itself described this "arbitrariness" standard as "very deferential to the [1]egislature." 11
Under this new test, a plaintiff must show the system is arbitrary, which
effectively makes it nearly impossible to challenge the state's legislative
discretion. 1 6 In addition, establishing that the issue of whether the system is constitutional is a question of law removed any real discretion
from district court fact findings and placed the power solely into the
hands of the Texas Supreme Court.11 7 In my previous analysis of this
case, I concluded that "[i]t is difficult to contemplate a school finance
system that would not meet this 'arbitrariness' test."118 Unfortunately,
my opinion proved to be right." 9
The Edgewood VI case further weakened the equal access provisions of
the Court's constitutional jurisprudence by concluding that "[e]fficiency
requires only substantially equal access to revenue for facilities necessary
for an adequate system." 1 20 Thus, the Court doubled down on its arbi-

111. Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2005).
112. See id. at 784 ("Article VII, Section 1 allows the Legislature a large measure of
discretion on two levels. The Legislature is entitled to determine what public education is
necessary for the constitutionally required "general diffusion of knowledge", and then to
determine the means for providing that education.").
113. Id. at 785.
114. Id.

115. Id. at 790.
116. See id. at 789-91 (concluding the legislature did not act arbitrarily in structuring
and funding the public education system).
117. Id. at 785.
118. Kauffman, supra note 16, at 549.
119. See Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826, 857 (Tex. 2016) ("[W]e cannot say that the
State has acted in an unconstitutionally arbitrary manner simply because it has not attempted to assign precise dollar values as to the costs of providing a general diffusion of
knowledge.").
120. Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d 746, 792 (Tex. 2005).
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trariness standard and substantially equal requirements. To add further
insult to injury, the Court also disregarded the district court's finding of
an impending constitutional violation as insufficient-to the Court, only a
121
finding of an existing constitutional violation would be enough.
In Edgewood VI, the Texas Supreme Court dealt a breathtaking sleight
of hand. After holding that the system was financially efficient, equitable, and adequate for all districts, the court also held that districts were
denied their constitutional rights because of the limits on tax rates available to them. 1 22 Of course, this tax rate limitation argument benefited
only the wealthy districts. 123 This is so because only wealthy districts
stand to gain from tax rates above the state set levels because only
wealthy districts generate significant monies from locally generated tax
124
Yet,
rates and do not need supplemental monies provided by the state.
this argument was based on the districts' inability to support an adequate
125
In
system with the current tax rates allowed under the state system.
other words, the Court held that the state system was fair to all districts
except wealthy districts. 126
Although it concluded that all districts had adequate funding despite
the fact that wealthy districts had substantially more money than lowwealth districts, the Court nevertheless held that the finance system was
unconstitutional because it did not allow wealthier districts to raise their
own tax rates, which hindered their ability to provide local supplementation. 12 7 As such, the Court's decision recognized-indeed protectedthe rights of districts that have always held a superior position in the
12 8
Texas school finance system and perpetuated such superiority.
III.

MORATH/EDGEWOOD

VII (2015)

After another period of relative peace in the school finance litigation
world, a wide range of districts once again filed a lawsuit against the
Texas legislature's decision to decrease school finance funding by over $5

121. Id. at 792 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 797.
123. See id. at 797-98 (explaining that removing the cap on the tax rate would increase revenue disparity among the property-rich and property-poor districts).
124. Id. at 798.

125. Id. at 796-97.
126. Kauffman, supra note 16, at 551 (emphasis added).
127. Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d 746, 796-98 (Tex. 2005).
128. This inconsistent logic is more fully explained in Kauffman, supra note 16, at 551.
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billion for the 2012-2013 fiscal year. 1 29 This set the stage for the Morath/
Edgewood VII opinion.
A.

The Morath/Edgewood VII District Court Decision

The district court that heard Edgewood I in 1984130 wrote the most
detailed description of the Texas school finance system ever produced.
Thirty years later, the same court issued a 400-page, single-spaced opinion."' The district court carefully followed the guidelines set by the
Texas Supreme Court in Edgewood VI and found the school finance system deficient in four respects:(1) the Texas school finance system was not
adequate and therefore violated the education clause of the Texas Constitution; 132 (2) likewise, the system was not suitable and violated the education clause of the Texas Constitution; 33 (3) the funding system
constituted a statewide ad valorem tax and violated the ad valorem clause
of the Texas Constitution; 134 and (4) the system was not financially efficient because it failed to provide substantially equal access to funds necessary to accomplish a general diffusion of knowledge (in other words, it
did not meet the standards of Edgewood I regarding equity and efficiency). 3 Moreover, the district court specifically addressed the system's
inadequacy and unsuitableness for two groups of students: English Language Learners (ELL) and students who are economically
disadvantaged.1 36
There were six groups of plaintiffs in the case: three groups of low and
middle wealth school districts; one group of high wealth school districts;
charter school plaintiffs; and a group of "efficiency" intervenors. 1 37 The

129. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal. v. Williams, No. D-1-GN-11-003130,
2014 WL 4254969, at *3 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 200th Aug. 28, 2014) affd in part and rev'd in part

by Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2015).
130. Teresa Palomo Acosta, Edgewood ISD v. Kirby,

HANDBOOK OF

TEX.

ONLINE,

https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/jre02 [https://perma.cc/QSX3-CEEN] (last
visited April 9, 2017); TRIBPEDIA: School Finance, TEX. TRIBUNE, https://www.texastribune.org/tribpedialschool-finance/about
[https://perma.cc/TUS4-HFXX] (last visited
Mar. 18, 2017).
131. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., No. D-1-GN-11-003130, 2014 WL
4254969 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 200th Aug. 28, 2014) aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Edgewood
VII, 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2015).
132. Id. at *347-48.
133. Id. at *348.

134. Id. at *343.
135. Id. at *351.

136. Id. at *87-88.
137. The district court opinion identifies the parties involved as follows:
(1) four plaintiff coalitions primarily composed of independent school districts (collectively, the "ISD Plaintiffs"), (2) a group of intervening parties referred to during the
trial as the " 'Efficiency Intervenors" or the "Intervenors," and (3) a group of plain-
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district court upheld the school districts' claims that the school finance
system was inadequate and unsuitable"'s and also upheld the low- and
mid-wealth school districts' claims that the system was financially inefficient. 139 Further, the district court not only found that charter school
funding was constitutionally inadequate, but also that charter schools did
not have an appropriate cause of action under Article VII, Section 1 of
the Texas Constitution.14 0 The district court also denied the "efficiency
intervenors"' claims that the school finance system wasted funds because
of its inefficient use of tax resources for matters such as teacher salaries. 141 Lastly, the court denied the intervenors' qualitative efficiency
claim seeking a dedication of state school funds to public school charters
or vouchers. 142
B.

A Summary of the Morath/Edgewood VII Supreme Court Opinion

In MorathlEdgewood VII, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the entire
Texas school finance system. 14 3 Following the standards set out in
Edgewood VI,'4 the MorathlEdgewood VII court held that the school
finance system was adequate, suitable, efficient, and did not amount to an
unconstitutional state-wide property tax. 145 Additionally, the court re146
This
jected the charter schools' and the efficiency intervenors' claims.
section sets forth the Texas Supreme Court's major holdings and standard
of review for the school finance system litigation.
The Court began its analysis by describing the four integrated components of the school finance system: (1) the state curriculum; (2) the standardized test; (3) accreditation standards; and (4) sanctions and remedial
measures.1 47 While the legislature certainly provided a set of statutes and
regulations that appear to create a well-structured and designed sys-

tiffs affiliated with the Texas Charter School Association (the "Charter School
Plaintiffs").
Id. at *2. For purposes of this Article, the author divides the first group of plaintiffs, "ISD
Plaintiffs," into four individual categories: three low- and middle wealth-districts and one
high-wealth district.

138. Id. at *13.
139. Id. at *351.
140. Id at *353.
141. Id. at *358.

142. Id at *331.
143. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826, 826 (Tex. 2016).
144. See Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d 746, 753 (Tex. 2005) (defining constitutional standards of efficiency and adequacy).
145. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 826.
146. Id. at 876-81.
147. Id. at 834.

THE SCHOLAR

164

[Vol. 19:145

tem,14 8 under the Court's extremely deferential review, any given set of
state statutes and regulations could meet the Court's standards. However, the school districts produced a thorough record of failures in the
school finance system, including the lack of progress and achievement in
all districts and the significant gaps between poor and wealthy students
and minority and non-minority students.1 4 9 Nevertheless, the Court dismissed the district court's extensive and well-documented findings with a
simple holding that the state legislature has discretion to decrease funding
by $5 billion."so The only justification the state offered for the insidious
low achievement was the limited progress made over the years.1 51
In analyzing the curriculum testing, accreditation standards, sanctions,
and remedial measures, the Court consistently and cavalierly overruled
the findings of the district court, which had found significant disparities
and violations in each of these four components. 1 5 2 Importantly, the
Texas Constitution and relevant case law significantly limit the authority
of the appellate courts to overrule findings of a district court, even if
those findings are made by a judge rather than a jury.' Moreover,
148. See id. at 834-36 (describing the various objectives and responsibilities imposed
on the state school systems by the legislature via the Texas Education Code).

149. Id. at 841, 859-68.
150. See id. at 886 (holding it is within the legislature's province to create education
policy and the judicial standard for review counsels "modesty" when considering whether
the school system is constitutional).
151. Id. at 866.
152. Cf id. at 859 (concluding that an achievement gap between students does not
establish the school system failed in its allocation of resources). In overruling the district
court, the Texas Supreme Court disregarded data presented that reflected achievement
gaps for economically disadvantaged students because "more money does not guarantee
better schools or more educated students." Id. at 860 (internal quotations omitted).
153. E.g., Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) (declaring trial court findings
may be overturned only when they are in contradiction of the great weight and preponderance of evidence, making them incorrect and unjust); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc.
v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995) (prohibiting a reviewing court from declaring
an abuse of discretion by a trial court merely because the trial court ruled differently than
the reviewing court would have); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794
(Tex. 1991) (stating that facts found in a bench trial carry the same force as a jury's verdict
and are subject to the same standard of review). The trial court entered over 5,000 exhibits
in the case, heard competing testimony from nearly one-hundred expert and lay witnesses,
and was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and accompanying
evidence during nearly four months of trial. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal. v.
Williams, No. D-1-GN-11-003130, 2014 WL 4254969, at * 1 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 200th Aug. 28,
2014) aff'd in partand rev'd in part by Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2015). Following trial, the judge painstakingly examined the evidence as a whole for several months
before issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law on the many difficult issues before
him. In this case, the court can only reverse based on incorrect fact findings if it finds no
evidence to support the findings. Ortiz, 917 S.W.2d at 772. A finding of insufficient evidence, though the Supreme Court does not have direct authority to make such a holding,
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Texas standards of appellate review do not allow appellate courts to make
fact findings but merely review the lower court's fact findings for legal
and factual sufficiency. 154 Indeed, the Texas Constitution itself prevents
the Supreme Court from making findings of fact. 55 Unfortunately, the
Texas Supreme Court consistently violated these principles and ignored
the tried and true appellate standard of pointing out that the district court
did not give sufficient weight to certain parts of the record or did not
review the facts with the proper deference to the legislature. The Court
stated its standard of review as follows:
Our role is consequential yet confined, strictly circumscribed by a
deferential standard of review, as well as our own prior decisions in
this unique area of the law.
In this direct appeal, we have no jurisdiction "over any question of
fact," and must "rely entirely on the district court's findings." But in
deciding the constitutional issues, "those findings have a limited
role." Whether the public school system is constitutionalis ultimately
a question of law. And under our settled precedent, which frowns
upon judicial second-guessing of policy choices, we presume the system is constitutional.
In [Edgewood VI], we recognized an arbitrarinessstandard for challenges under [A]rticle VII, [Slection 1. Under this "very deferential"
standard, we must not substitute our policy preferences for the Legislature's, but "must on the other hand examine the Legislature's
choices carefully to determine whether those choices meet the requirements of the Constitution." "If the Legislature's choices are informed by guiding rules and principles properly related to public
education-that is, if the choices are not arbitrary-thenthe system
does not violate the constitutional provision." At bottom, the "crux"
of this standard is "reasonableness,"and the lens through which we
view these challenges maintains a default position of deference to the

would lead to remand to the district court for a new trial. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715

S.W.2d 629, 632-33 (Tex. 1986).
154. Tex. Const. art. V, § 6; see also Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 634 (holding that a reviewing
court is permitted to "unfind" facts even though they cannot "find" them).
155. Tex. Const. art. V, §§ 3, 6. Article V, Section 3 the Texas Constitution indicates
that the Supreme Court's determinations are final with regards to all non-criminal law
cases and other matters described within the constitution. Tex. Const. art. V, § 3. Article
V, Section 6 describes the scope of authority of the appellate circuit and describes all appellate court decisions to be "conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on
appeal or error." Tex. Const. art. V, § 6 (emphasis added). Therefore, by designating the
appellate court as making final conclusions of fact, the legislature specifically removed this
authority from the Texas Supreme Court.
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Legislature-thatpolitical branch responsible for establishing a constitutionally compliant system. 1 5 6
In effect, the court established a set of legal hurdles that no party attempting to challenge the school finance system can overcome. Further,
the Court's extreme deference to the legislature means they will only
overrule such legislation if it is arbitrary and unreasonable. 5 7 Even
worse, when determining whether the system has met the constitutional
requirements of equitable access and adequacy, the Court applies the
standard the legislature has itself set.15 That is, the legislature sets the
standard for what constitutes an "adequate education" and "equitable access," and the Court then takes that standard and applies it to a deferential review of the law 15 1 Such a system of review thus weighs even more
heavily in favor of the state than the extremely weal standard in
Edgewood VI."
In reality, the Texas legislature will only move towards equity and adequacy only if it is aware of the Texas Supreme Court's sword of Damocles" dangling over their heads.16 1
The legislative deference evident in Morath/Edgewood VII is especially
surprising when compared to that in Patel v. Department of Licensing and
Regulation.16 2 In Patel, the Court applied a much more critical analysis of
state methods and motivations than they did to the school finance system
in Morath/Edgewood VII.1 63 For example, Justice Willett, who also authored the opinion in MorathlEdgewood VII, passionately criticizes state

156. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826, 846 (Tex. 2016) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
157. Id. at 863.
158. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.001 (West 2015); Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 849.
The Texas Supreme Court recognizes the legislature's ability to "retain, revise, or replace
[the Education Code] to reflect its current view of what the required curriculum" should
entail. Id.
159. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 849.
160. Compare Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d 746, 785 (Tex. 2005) ("If the Legislature's
choices are informed by guiding rules and principles properly related to public educationthat is, if the choices are not arbitrary-then the system does not violate the constitutional
provision."), with Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 846 ("At bottom, the 'crux' of this standard is 'reasonableness,' and the lens through which we view these challenges maintains a
default position of deference to the Legislature-that political branch responsible for establishing a constitutionally compliant system.").
161. See Sword of Damocles, CAMBRIDGE DiCiIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge
.org/us/dictionary/english/sword-of-damocles [https://perma.cc/8PN8-HLPJ] (last visited
April 21, 2017) (defining the idiom as the threat of imminent harm or danger).
162. Patel v. Tex. Dep't of Licensing and Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015). The
Court in Patel applied a careful and deadly review of state regulations as they pertained to
eyebrow threading businesses. Id.
163. The standard in Patel is as follows:
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overreach in the eyebrow threader market. Most notably, he concludes
by stating, "I prefer authentic judicial scrutiny to a rubber-stamp exercise
that stacks the legal deck in government's favor." 1 64 Justice Willett develops the role of judicial review of legislative action as follows:
I would not have Texas judges condone government's dreamed-up
justifications (or dream up post hoc justifications themselves) for interfering with citizens' constitutional guarantees. As in other constitutional settings, we should be neutral arbiters, not bend-overbackwards advocates for the government. Texas judges weighing
state constitutional challenges should scrutinize government's actual
justifications for a law-what policymakers really had in mind at the
time, not something they dreamed up after litigation erupted. And
judges should not be obliged to concoct speculative or farfetched rationalizations to save the government's case. 65
Much of the Patel decision is rooted in the importance of liberty found
6
in the Texas Constitution. 1 6
The education clause bears the same relationship to liberty and the
rights of the people as do the sections of the Texas Constitution on which
the Patel court so intensely relied.1 67 Justice Willett's concurring opinion

In sum, statutes are presumed to be constitutional. To overcome that presumption,
the proponent of an as-applied challenge to an economic regulation statute under Section 19's substantive due course of law requirement must demonstrate that either (1)
the statute's purpose could not arguably be rationally related to a legitimate govern-

mental interest; or (2) when considered as a whole, the statute's actual, real-world
effect as applied to the challenging party could not arguably be rationally related to,
or is so burdensome as to be oppressive in light of, the governmental interest. To be
clear, the foregoing standard includes the presumption that legislative enactments are
constitutional, and places a high burden on parties claiming a statute is unconstitutional. The presumption of constitutionality and the high burden to show unconstitutionality would apply as well to regulations adopted by an agency pursuant to
statutory authority. Although whether a law is unconstitutional is a question of law,
the determination will in most instances require the reviewing court to consider the
entire record, including evidence offered by the parties.
Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 87 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 110 (Willet, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 116.
166. Id. at 80, 92.
167. Compare Tex. Const. art VII, § 1 ("A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the
Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.") (emphasis added), with Patel, 469
S.W.3d at 80 (relying on Article 1, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution, which provides
"[n]o citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.")
(emphasis added).
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also expresses real concern with legislative indifference and insensitivity
to the rights of the people:
As judges, we have no business second guessing policy choices, but
when the Constitution is at stake, it is not impolite to say "no" to
government. Liberties for "We the People" necessarily mean limits
on "We the Government." That's the very reason constitutions are
written: to stop government abuses, not to ratify them. Our supreme
duty to our dual constitutions and to their shared purpose-to "secure the Blessings of Liberty"-requires us to check constitutionally
verboten actions, not rubber-stamp them under the banner of
majoritarianism.' 68
In essence, Patel is a return to Lochner v. New Yorkl 69 because it reinvigorates substantive due process, which led Chief Justice Hecht to confront the Court's recidivism directly in his dissent. 7 0 This shocking
difference in approach to philosophical songs of liberty and the realities
of school finance belie any sharp distinctions between the "due course of
law," clause' and the education clause' 7 2 of the Texas Constitution. The
Texas Supreme Court has the power to devise any test it wants to avoid
difficult decisions or to extend their philosophical approaches to judicial
decision-making in favor of their personal theories of government. But in
the case of school finance, millions of children suffer, and that is a real
tragedy. 1 3
IV.

ANALYSIS

OF THE SUPREME COURT'S PURPORTED REASONING

IN MORATHIEDGEWOOD

VII

This Part provides a brief summary of the professed reasons for the
Court's decisions in MorathlEdgewood VII, focusing on the six crucial
issues the Court addressed: (1) adequacy; (2) suitability; (3) financial efficiency; (4) qualitative efficiency; (5) charter school claims; and (6) the
statewide ad valorem tax.

168. Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 120 (Willet, J., concurring).
169. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
170. Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 120 (Hecht, C.J., dissenting).
171. Tex. Const. art I, § 19.
172. Tex. Const. art VII, § 1.
173. See Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826, 833-34 (Tex. 2016) (acknowledging that
more than five million children in Texas are affected by the ongoing litigation and deserve
better).
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Adequacy

The Texas Supreme Court will uphold a school system as constitutionally adequate if it achieves a general diffusion of knowledge, as defined
by the Texas Education Code.174 Specifically, the legislature's constitutional obligation is satisfied if schools reasonably provide students with
"access to a quality education that enables them to achieve their potential," and "a meaningful opportunity to acquire the essential knowledge
and skills, reflected in the curriculum requirements.""' The Court
presumes the legislature has met its standards as long as the state has
17 6
Unfortunately, the
devised a curriculum and accountability regime.
Court's analysis of the system's adequacy is plagued with errors.
Moreover, in its analysis the Texas Supreme Court eschewed a review
of expert studies addressing the standards of school funding throughout
the country."' At trial, three different experts using different techniques
concluded the Texas school finance system is underfunded, with one expert claiming the system was underfunded by at least $1,000 per weighted
student (on top of the present $5,500).178 The experts based their analyses of the adequate cost of education on methods approved in states
throughout the country that are considered to be the "best practice" for
1 79
making such an evaluation.
Nevertheless, the Court held there is no duty in Texas to meet the best
practice standard.1 so In fact, the Court ignored the proper method of
evaluating educational costs, which stresses that the Court should use
outputs (for example, graduation rates and test scores), not inputs, to
evaluate the school finance system."' In other words, the Court did not
accept the experts' analyses and stated that, even if acceptable, the studies were irrelevant. 182 However, this is inconsistent with the Court's previous analyses in Edgewood I, Edgewood II, and Edgewood IV, as well as

174.
175.
176.
177.

TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.001 (West 2015); Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 849.
Id.
Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 849.
See id. at 850-51 (disagreeing with the trial court's reliance on experts).

178. Id. at 850.
179. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal. v. Williams, No. D-1-GN-11-003130,
2014 WL 4254969, at *164 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 200th Aug. 28, 2014) affd in part and rev'd in part
by Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2015) (discussing how Allan Odden estimated the
cost of adequate school funding levels for Texas school districts through an "evidencebased" approach which has been accepted and adopted as the basis for state school finance
systems in other states).

180. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 855.
181. Id. at 857.
182. Id. at 850.
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with the best practice standards used by other state supreme courts in
making these types of evaluations.18 3
Further strangling and setting aside "best practices," the Court made
one of its most illogical jumps: it quoted language from the United States
Supreme Court case San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguezl8 to invalidate the correlation between additional educational expenditures and increased quality of education.1 ss The Morath/Edgewood
VII court then jumped to the Coleman Report, on which Rodriguez also
relied. 18 6 In so doing, the Court ignored its previous decision in
Edgewood I to apply the standards of the Texas Constitution, not the U.S.
Constitution.1 87

The Texas Constitution has strong, clear, and enforceable standards to
determine the equity and equality of the Texas school finance system.""8
However, in a footnote, the Court decided which body of educational
research regarding the importance of education funding was appropriate.18 9 As such, the Court dismissed the studies, authors, and underlying
data that partly informed the district court's decision and took a clear
side in the education funding debate, thus rendering their holding clearly
unwarranted. 190
Another major weakness of the Court's test can be seen in the section
of the Edgewood VII opinion addressing the adequacy issue.' 9 1 The district court relied on Edgewood IV, stating that an "adequate education"
should be funded with at least$3,500 per weighted student. 1 9 2 However,
the Morath/Edgewood VII court rejected the district court's holding because that figure arose in the context of a discussion on financial efficiency, not on adequacy. 1 9 3 Using this reasoning, the Court could ignore

183. E.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995)
(discussing how performance levels on standard competency examinations are helpful in

determining if minimum education has been provided).
184. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
185. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 851 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973)).
186. Id. at 851-52 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 43,
48 (1973)).
187. See generally Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (analyzing the constitutionality of the school finance system according to the education clause in the Texas
Constitution).
188. Tex. Const. art VII, § 1.
189. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 852 n.152.
190. The weaknesses of the Coleman study are discussed in Part V.A. infra.
191. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 849-68.
192. Id. at 853-54.
193. Id.
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the system's tremendous inequities at the higher tax levels and higher
expenditures that exist within the Texas school finance system.1 9 4
The philosophical weakness of the Texas Supreme Court's holdings are
summarized in one pithy phrase found in the opinion: "[M]any of these
findings do not appreciate that the constitutional standard demands not
the best education, but only an educational system that is adequate to
provide a general diffusion of knowledge." 19 5 The state admitted it had
not calculated the cost of an adequate education-even though state law
required it to do so; however, the Court again excused the legislature's
failure by relying on the erroneous assumption that inputs in the school
finance system are not of constitutional import.1 96
In addressing the adequacy issue, the Court struck the district court's
findings that the statutory weights in the school finance system were constitutionally inadequate, specifically because they allotted slightly more
funds to ELL and economically disadvantaged students."' To do so, the
Court fell back on its standard that any reviewing court must review the
school finance system as a whole and not on the individual components of
the system.198 The Court's reluctance is apparently based on the fear that
it will invite various subpopulations of students to file similar claims with
"no end in sight."' 99 Had the Court simply reviewed the district court's
record, it would have discovered that ELL students and economically disadvantaged students are disproportionately negatively impacted by the
insufficient funding arising out of the current Texas school finance
system. 20
One of the more egregious sleights of hand in Morath/Edgewood VII
was the Court's failure to require the legislature to narrow the insidious
and threatening gaps in performance between poor and rich students and
ELL and non-ELL students. 2 01 The district court carefully analyzed the
outputs of the school finance system by focusing on the testing system,
end of course exams, SAT and ACT exams, and by comparing graduation

194. Id. These disparities were exhaustively chronicled in the district court decision.
Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal. v. Williams, No. D-1-GN-11-003130, 2014 WL
4254969, at *9-12 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 200th Aug. 28, 2014) aff'd in part and rev'd in part by
Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2015).
195. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 855.
196. Id. at 857.
197. Id. at 857-63.

198. Id. at 858.
199. Id. at 859 (quoting Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d 746, 801 (Tex. 2005) (Brister, J.,
dissenting)).
200. See id. at 858-59 (providing that the trial court held the school system was constitutionally inadequate and unsuitable to ELL and economically disadvantaged students because of inadequate funding).
201. Id. at 866.
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rates and dropout rates. 2 0 2 In contrast, when confronted with the clearly
negative effects of the current system's outputs, the Court retreated again
to its deference to the legislature and its related holding that the school
finance system set forth by the legislature is not an arbitrary and unreasonable effort to provide a general diffusion of knowledge.20 3 Further,
the Court rationalized excusing the extremely deleterious effects of student test performance and how they negatively impact communities by
stressing that the Texas Education Agency occasionally punishes districts
for poor test results .204 Given the tragic numbers, the Court retreated
even further by holding, "[W]e cannot conclude that the legislatively designed system provides and requires so little as to indicate that the Legislature has arbitrarily abandoned its duty to provide a general diffusion of
knowledge." 2 05
The district court's finding that the school finance system especially underfunded ELL and economically disadvantaged students seemed to encourage the Court's revisionist outlook on history and sociology. For
instance, the Court made the following assumption:
[F]actors outside the classroom play an undeniable role in many children's lives. The Coleman Report, as discussed above, reached the
seismic conclusion a half-century ago that family-related variables,
for example, matter more-far more-than per-pupil expenditures
when it comes to predicting academic success. The Plaintiffs
presented much data on achievement gaps of ELL and economically
disadvantaged students, but did not prove that those gaps could be
eliminated or significantly reduced by allocating a greater share of
funding to these groups. Again, as we have recognized, "more
money does not guarantee better schools or more educated
students." 2 0
In its final leap backwards, the Court relied on its opinion in Edgewood
VI to conclude that, despite the current school finance system's significant gaps and failures, the few good statistics that did exist were sufficient
to offset the negative ones.2 07 This is precisely the sort of weighing of
facts the Court should avoid doing because it invades the province of the
fact finder. 2 0 8 After realizing that the record convincingly showed the

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 863.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 864.
Id.
Id. at 860 (quoting Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d 746, 788 (Tex. 2005)).
Id. at 868.
Id. at 846.
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current funding was inadequate, the Court increased its legislative deference and thereby further weakened its own test:
It is safe to say that the current Texas school system leaves much to
be desired. Few would argue that the State cannot do better. But
our function is limited to reviewing the constitutionality of the system under an extremely deferential standard, one that places the
burden of proving the system constitutionally inadequate on the
20 9
party challenging it. The Plaintiffs did not meet that burden.
B.

Suitability

I appreciate the Texas Supreme Court's candor when it held the school
finance system was suitable. 2 10 For instance, the Court admitted that the
suitability element was not fleshed out in Edgewood VI, where it was
"discovered." 2 1 1 The Court also admitted that the suitability element is
similar to that of adequacy. 212 What is unique about the suitability element is that it would lead the Court to declare the school finance system
unconstitutional if the legislature allowed districts to ignore legislative
goals.2 13 Further, the Court found the district court's analysis inappropriate because, in the Court's view, "heavy a reliance on local tax revenues
2 14
Fito fund the system [does] not . . . render the system unsuitable."
chosen
the
means
on
is
based
suitability
that
stated
Court
the
nally, while
to achieve an adequate education, it admitted both that it has never held
the school finance system to be constitutionally unsuitable and cannot
215
outline an appropriate case of suitability given the Court's standards.
C.

FinancialEfficiency

In its analysis of the financial efficiency issue, the Court purported to
rely on its decisions in Edgewood I and Edgewood J.216 However, the
Court clearly applied the Edgewood Ha test, which requires that the legislature need only provide equal access to funding up to the amounts necessary to provide for "a general diffusion of knowledge." 2 1 7 Moreover,
the MorathlEdgewood VII court analyzed previous Texas Supreme Court

209. Id. at 868.

.

210. Id. at 870.
211. See id. at 869 ("In [Edgewood VI], in two paragraphs, we held the suitability
requirement was met . .

212. Id. at 868-69.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 869.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 870.
Id.
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school finance opinions to determine the ratios between wealthier districts and poor districts 218 and accepted the ratios established in the
Edgewood I record.2 19
The Court then compared the ratios in Edgewood I, which declared the
school finance system unconstitutional, with Edgewood II, Edgewood IV,
which upheld the school finance system as constitutional, and Edgewood
VI with the ratios in the case before them. 2 2 0 Because of the changes the
legislature made in response to Edgewood I and Edgewood II, these ratios have improved. 2 2 1 The ratios particularly improved due to the system of recapturing tax monies from very wealthy districts and sharing
them with the rest of the districts in the state.22 2 Indeed, each year this
recapture system generates approximately $1-2 billion per year.223 in
turn, these monies both improve the overall level of funding in the system
and significantly reduce the ratios between the wealthiest and poorest
districts.22 4
However, the court's analysis of ratios ignored a salient fact. In every
comparison, the low wealth districts suffered more than the high wealth
districts. 2 2 5 The Court seemingly accepted offhand ratios of 1.4 between
revenues available to richer districts and revenues available to poor districts; 2 2 6 but, the pattern has always been the same: the very wealthy districts continue to enjoy the advantages they had at the time the Court
decided Edgewood I in 1989, which has been the case since the state began recording such data. 2 2 7 Additionally, the Court seems to ignore the

218. Id. at 871-75.
219. Id. at 874. The Court did so by comparing the ratio between property wealth per
student, the amount of total property wealth, and the disparities in per student revenue at
the wealthiest districts and the poorest districts. Id.
220. Id. In discussing the wealth ratios, the court in Edgewood I stated the following:
The wealthiest district has over $14,000,000 of property wealth per student, while the
poorest has approximately $20,000; this disparity reflects a 700 to 1 ratio. The 300,000
students in the lowest-wealth schools have less than 3% of the state's property wealth
to support their education while the 300,000 students in the highest-wealth schools
have over 25% of the state's property wealth; thus the 300,000 students in the wealthiest districts have more than eight times the property value to support their education
as the 300,000 students in the poorest districts. The average property wealth in the 100
wealthiest districts is more than twenty times greater than the average property wealth
in the 100 poorest districts.

Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989).
221. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 873-74.

222. Id. at 873.
223. Id. at 883.
224. Id. at 874.

225. Id. at 871.
226. Id. at 873.
227. Id. at 871-75.
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possibility that, from time to time, some ratios should actually favor of
poor districts.228 For instance, poor districts should have 40% more revenue per weighted student than richer districts, 40% lower tax rates than
wealthy districts, and access to the same or even greater wealth per student to tax for facilities than do wealthy districts.
The MorathlEdgewood VII court criticized the district court for considering analyses of the tax rates required to obtain the funding necessary
for a truly adequate system.22 ' Although the gap between rich and poor
districts-in terms of tax rates needed to raise the amounts for an adequate system as defined by the State-has been reduced, the ratios between tax rates for poor districts and tax rates for rich districts have
increased. 23 0 Likewise, when one compares the tax rates necessary for
low wealth districts to raise the monies to fund a truly adequate system,
these ratios are facially unfair and embarrassing. Unlike the Texas Supreme Court, the district court closely considered these ratios and the
calculations on which they are based.2 31
D.

Qualitative Efficiency Claims

The "efficiency intervenors" attempted to apply the efficiency standard
in Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution, to impose their personal preferences on the way the legislature should administer Texas
schools.2 32 In essence, the efficiency intervenors advocated for a system
that spends less money overall while effectively increasing the amount of
funds spent on charter schools and restructuring the school finance system according to their experts' standards. 233 The court appropriately
rebuffed these efforts.234
E.

The Charter School Claims

A group of charter schools joined the school districts in alleging that
the funding for public schools was inadequate. 235 They did so because
funding for charter schools is tied directly to the monies available to the
23 6
In addition, charter
public school districts in which they are located.

228. Id.
229. Id. at 875.
230. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal. v. Williams, No. D-1-GN-11-003130,
2014 WL 4254969, at *86-97 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 200th Aug. 28, 2014) aff'd in part and rev'd in
part by Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2015).
231. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 844, 875.
232. Id. at 844, 876.
233. Id. at 844, 876-79.
234. Id. at 844, 879.

235. Id.
236. Id.
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schools do not get funding for facilities.23 7 However, the state grants
charter schools waivers from state requirements that apply to all public
schools, such as teacher certification requirements, salary scale requirements, and student-teacher ratios.238 As such, the Texas Supreme Court
held that these differences make any comparisons between the charter
schools and public school funding inappropriate.2 39
F.

Statewide Ad Valorem Tax Claims

In Edgewood VI, the Court held the school finance system unconstitutional based solely on what it viewed as an imposition of a statewide ad
valorem tax.2 4 0 That claim was made on behalf of wealthy districts that
were required to share a portion of their tax wealth with the state school
finance system, which effectively denied them the significant advantages
they typically held over other districts in the state.2 41
Even though the Edgewood VI court held the system was equitable and
adequate, it concluded that school districts did not have meaningful discretion to raise the monies they needed for an adequate system.2 42 Such
an inconsistent holding clearly benefitted one group of districts-those
with great wealth and political power. Nevertheless, the Morath/
Edgewood VII court held that the districts were not denied meaningful
discretion because they retained some flexibility to raise taxes within the
school finance system.24 3 Further, the Court maintained that the majority
of districts were not taxing at the maximum levels set by the statutes.2 44
In response, the districts argued that the school finance system the legislature passed in response to Edgewood VI significantly limited their ability to raise tax rates by requiring a tax election to raise taxes anywhere
above $1.04.245 This argument proved unconvincing, as the Court denied
their statewide ad valorem tax claim.246 Notwithstanding their denial of
the claim, the Court outlined a how school districts could potentially
make a statewide property tax claim,247 though even this potential claim
would be difficult to meet.

237. Id.

238. Id. at 844, 880.
239. Id.
240. Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d 746, 794 (Tex. 2005).
241. Id. at 794.

242. Id. at 795.
243. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 881-85.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 882.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 884.
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The Concurring Opinions

Justices Guzman and Lehrmann filed a concurring opinion pointing out
248
the educational challenges for economically disadvantaged students.
They offered a sympathetic view of Texas students' continued low performance, especially low-income students. 2 4 9 However, both justices still
joined the majority opinion. 2 5 0 Additionally, although Justices Boyd,
Lehrmann and Devine clearly highlighted their personal concerns with
the school finance system, they also agreed that the Court should be extremely deferential to the legislature. 2 5 1
In summary, the MorathlEdgewood VII opinion not only applied an
inappropriate legal test the Court developed in Edgewood VI, it weakened the test further. The Court gave no weight to the district court's
findings and added its own philosophical gloss to its school finance jurisprudence by allowing the socio-cultural arguments that "money does not
make a difference" and "the students' family structure is more at fault
25 2
than the state's failure to meet its constitutional responsibilities."
Texas can surely do better.
V.

THE SUPREME COURT MISINTERPRETED EDUCATIONAL STUDIES

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOURCES TO EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE
AND IGNORED ITS OWN PRECEDENTS AND TEXAS HISTORY

A.

The Coleman Report

The MorathlEdgewood VII decision was largely based on a fifty-yearold study that research and scholarly works have since discredi-

248. Id. at 887-92 (Guzman, J., concurring). The concurring opinion addresses hardships faced by economically disadvantaged students by stating the following:
Poor children may never have been more than a few blocks away from home, never
had access to computers or visited a museum. Their families, often lacking the means
to provide academic support and stability, are struggling to provide their children with
reliable nutrition, health care, housing, and transportation and, as a result, may move
often. Once in school, low-income children are frequently without the opportunity,
means, or transportation for extracurricular activities, after-school tutoring, summer
school, or other enrichment activities.

Id at 888.
249. Id. at 889-92 (acknowledging a performance gap between all students and those
who are economically disadvantaged, and suggesting that not being the worst is not good
enough).

250. Id. at 887.
251. Id. at 894 (Boyd, J., concurring).

252. Id. at 860.
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ted.25 3 Those who argue that increased funding does not make a difference in public school educational outcomes heavily rely on The Coleman
Report.2 54 . More specifically, proponents of the Report argue that the
Court should be less involved in equalizing funding because there is no
proof that additional funding leads to improved student achievement.2 55
Indeed, Morath/Edgewood VII highlights the Texas Supreme Court's reluctance to accept the best research principles and studies conducted in
Texas over the last twenty years.2 56
The Court's reliance on the Coleman Report infects the entire Morath/
Edgewood VII decision. In particular, once the court agreed there is no
real correlation between additional funding and student achievement, it
was easy for them to disregard data showing the differences in funds and
access to funds among all districts and the very strong record below showing that the overall funding of Texas public schools is inadequate.2 57
The Morath/Edgewood VII court describes the Coleman Report and
related arguments as follows:
But differences in achievement among subgroups do not necessarily
establish a failure of the school system in its allocation of resources.
The Coleman Report .

.

. concluded that factors distinguishing the

students themselves accounted for vastly larger differences in
achievement than differences in the resources provided by the school
system. The Plaintiffs concede that economically disadvantaged students face challenges outside the schools that affect their educational
achievement, and indeed offered much evidence to the trial court in
support of this position. According to the Edgewood Plaintiffs, "The
challenges that economically disadvantaged students face stem
largely from the opportunities they have available to them where
they live." This seems inarguable. Demography is not destiny.
Many of our most celebrated achievers-in every walk of life-overcame tough odds to thrive, conquering headwinds galore. But factors outside the classroom play an undeniable role in many children's
lives. The Coleman Report, as discussed above, reached the seismic
conclusion a half-century ago that family-related variables, for exam-

253. See id. at 852, 860 (acknowledging the controversy surrounding the fifty-year-old
Coleman Report and the hundreds of conflicting studies that followed it while later citing
the report and its assertion that family related variables matter more).
254. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 45; see also Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 851, 860
(using the Coleman Report to support its proposition that "more money does not guarantee better schools or more educated students").

255. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 851, 860.
256. See infra Part V.B.
257. See Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d at 833 (recognizing imperfections in the current
school funding regime but still holding the regime constitutional).
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ple, matter more-far more-than per-pupil expenditures when it
comes to predicting academic success. The Plaintiffs presented much
data on achievement gaps of ELL and economically disadvantaged
students, but did not prove that those gaps could be eliminated or
significantly reduced by allocating a greater share of funding to these
groups. Again, as we have recognized, "more money does not guar25 8
antee better schools or more educated students."
Unfortunately, the Court interpreted the Coleman Report far beyond
259
A
the research questions which formed its base and its conclusions.
1968 criticism of the Coleman Report summarized some of the report's
flawed reasoning. 2 6 0 For example, Samuel Bowles and Henry M. Levin
broadly criticize the Coleman Report and suggest that "because of poor
measurement of school resources, inadequate control for social background, and inappropriate statistical techniques . . . many of the findings
of the Report are not supported." 261 Bowles and Levin also cite numerous flaws in the report's measurement and construction which included
262
(2)
the following: (1) the lack of participation from several large cities;
the fact that a "large number of nonresponses (no answer or 'don't
know') . . . were simply given the arithmetic mean of the responses" ;263
(3) "the research design and the measurement of variables and the statistical procedures used were overwhelmingly biased in a direction that
2
would dampen the importance of school characteristics"; " (4) the report
distorted the measure for expenditure per pupil by ignoring school differences within a school district; 26 5 (5) the regression analysis did not include a measure for class size; 2 ' (6) the facilities measures used in the

258. Id. at 859-60 (footnotes omitted).
259. See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 45, at iii-iv (indicating that the Coleman Report
was conducted to address four questions specifically involving racial and ethnic groups).
260. See Samuel Bowles & Henry M. Levin, The Determinantsof Scholastic Achievement-An Appraisal of Some Recent Evidence, 3 J. Hum. REsouRCEs 3, 3 (1968) (scrutinizing the Coleman Report on several grounds in which the findings are based).

261. Id.
262. Id. at 6. The report also indicated "[complete sets of survey instruments were
returned for only 59 percent (689 out of 1,170) of the high schools." Id.
263. Id. at 6-7.
264. Id. at 8.
265. Id. (emphasis omitted). The article goes on to say, in a footnote, that "[w]hile the
survey amassed complete sets of data for about 3,100 schools, expenditure data were collected for only the 500 or so school districts in which these schools were located. (Some of
the metropolitan school districts that were included in the survey had 50 or more schools in
the sample that was used for the analysis.)." Id. at 8 n.9.
266. Id. at 11.
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analysis had a limited range; 267 (7) "the survey collected information
solely on current school inputs; thus, the analysis necessarily ignores the
effects of past influences on present achievement levels"; 2 6 8 (8) "the form
of the equation implies that the effect on achievement of an incremental
unit of a given input does not depend at all on how much of that input is
utilized"; 2 6 9 and (9) the achievement criterion gave "an advantage to students who are enrolled in academic and college preparatory curricula relative to those enrolled in basic, general, commercial, vocational, and
technical curricula." 2 7 0
Other social scientists have echoed these criticisms. For instance, according to Ronald P. Carver, "[I]t is not appropriate to draw conclusions
about achievement when the conclusions are based on results of tests that
were designed to maximize individual differences. The Coleman results
make a great deal more sense when the test score results are interpreted
as reflecting aptitude instead of achievement." 2 7 1
B.

Recent Studies Contradictthe Court's Conclusion

In addition to long-held criticisms of the Coleman Report, the Morath/
Edgewood VII court ignored more recent studies about Texas schools,
which were based on data that included more students than the Coleman
Report and utilized more valid, contemporary data statistics.27 2 For instance, Ronald F. Ferguson conducted a study specifically in Texas that
covered "over 2.4 million students in the almost 900 districts, represent[ing] five times the 569,000 children in the data that Coleman

267. See id. ("At grades 1, 3, and 6, the only facilities measure used was volumes-perstudent in the school library. At grades 9 and 12, the library variable was supplemented by
one representing the presence of science laboratory facilities.").
268. Id. at 12. Further, "the exclusion of past school inputs biases the analysis against
finding school resources to be an important determinant of scholastic achievement, because measures of social background will serve to some extent as proxies for the excluded
influence of past school inputs." Id.

269. Id. at 13-14.
270. Id. at 16.
271. Ronald P. Carver, The Coleman Report: Using Inappropriately Designed
Achievement Tests, 12 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 77, 77 (1975). Carver states the following:
In this regard, conclusions drawn from the Coleman Report can be no better than the
quality of the tests used in that report to measure achievement. These tests were
developed by a test company whose technical sophistication is exceeded by no other
test publishing company in the world. Yet, they were designed to be biased against
finding large differences between schools in achievement. The continued use of these
kinds of tests in education will continue to provide biased evidence against any educational treatment effect."
Id. at 77-78.
272. See Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2016) (omitting any mention or use of
Ronald F. Ferguson's study).
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used." 27 3 Ferguson concluded that achievement significantly depends on
factors such as teacher experience and quality "and that when targeted
and managed wisely, increased funding can improve the quality of public
education." 27 4
Even scholars who firmly believe that increased funding does not make
75
The great weight of
a difference have criticized the Coleman Report.2
recent research shows that funds, properly spent, have significant positive
2 76
effects on educational achievement, especially for minority students.
C.

Morath/Edgewood VII Is Inconsistent with the Law of the Case

Based on the district court's record and findings, Edgewood I held:
"[t]he amount of money spent on a student's education has a real and
meaningful impact on the educational opportunity offered that stu-

273. Ronald F. Ferguson, Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on How and

Why Money Matters, 28

HARV.

J.

ON LEGIs.

465, 488 (1991).

274. Id. "Results show that better literacy skills (in other words, higher [Texas Examination of Current Administrators and Teachers ('TECAT')] scores) among teachers, fewer
large classes and more teachers with five or more years of experience (nine or more for
high school) all predict better student test scores, controlling for a number of family and
community background factors." Id. "Even ignoring class sizes and teacher experience,
TECAT scores in Texas explain between twenty and twenty-five percent of the variation
across districts in students' test scores[.]" Id. at 490.
275. Henry S. Dyer, School Factors and Equal Educational Opportunity, 38 HARV.
Enuc. REv. 38, 39 (1968) (acknowledging the Coleman Report's faults such as the sample
of schools, the statistical design, and the over dependence on verbal learning as a proxy for
academic achievement); see also Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance "Reform" May
Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARv. J. ON LiGis. 423, 433-35, 439 (1991) (finding the "basic
determinants of instructional expenditures in a district are teacher experience, teacher education, and class size" and analyzing these expenditure components as inputs throughout
187 studies).
276. See Harold Wenglinsky, How Money Matters: The Effect of School District
Spending on Academic Achievement, 70 Soc. EDUC. 221, 221 (1997) ("[T]he economic resources of schools are associated with students' achievement"); C. Kirabo Jackson et al.,
The Effect of School Finance Reforms on the Distributionof Spending, Academic Achievement, and Adult Outcomes 4-5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
20118, 2014) ("Results from our event-study and instrumental variable models reveal that
increases in per-pupil spending, induced by court-mandated school finance reforms, led to
significant increases in the likelihood of graduating from high school and educational attainment for poor children"); Linda Darling-Hammond, Unequal Opportunity: Race and
Education, BROOKINGS (Mar. 1, 1998), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unequal-oppor("[E]ducation resources do
tunity-race-and-education [https://perma.cc/K7SA-XPRJ]
make a difference, particularly when funds are used to purchase well-qualified teachers
and high-quality curriculum."). See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Public Policy Priorities, et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, at *29-36, Williams et al, v. Calhoun
Cty. Indep. Sch. Dist., et al., (Tex. 2015) (No. 14-0776) (discussing empirical studies which
show increased funding improves outcomes for economically disadvantaged students).
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dent." 2 7 7 In contrast, Edgewood VI held that "more money does not
guarantee better schools or more educated students." 2 7 8 Despite the
holding in Edgewood VI, the Morath/Edgewood VII opinion performs
logical and legal backflips to promulgate the following standard:
The financial efficiency doctrine requires a rough equality of access
to district funding for similar tax effort. Its aim is equality of opportunity, not equality of results. We have never interpreted our Constitution, under the adequacy requirement, to mandate equality of
student achievement by district or student subgroup. Such equality
of results may not be possible through changes in school funding
alone, given the respected body of educational research holding that
school resources account for only a small fraction of differences in
student achievement. Equality of educational achievement is a worthy goal of government, and society at large, but it is not a constitutional requirement.2 7 9
Other state courts have acknowledged the money-achievement positive
relationship. In fact, both state Supreme Court and lower court opinions
have specifically noted the clear relationship between funding and student achievement.28 0
VI.

To

OBEY THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURT SHOULD APPLY
THE TEST FOR EFFICIENCY

EDGEWOOD

I

IT

DEVELOPED IN

AND EDGEWOOD 112"'

Following an extensive review of the history and interpretation of the
Texas Constitution, the Texas Supreme Court, in Edgewood I and

277. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989).
278. See Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d 746, 788 (Tex. 2005) ("[M]ore money does not
guarantee better schools or more educated students.").

279. Edgewood VII, 490 S.W.3d 826, 862-63 (Tex. 2016).
280. See Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Public Policy Priorities, et al. in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees, at 37, Williams et al, v. Calhoun Cty. Indep. Sch. Dist., et al., (Tex.
2015) (No. 14-0776) (citing Rebell, supra note 34, at 1484-85) (stating "of thirty state
courts that have considered the issue, twenty-nine have determined that funding levels are
an important factor in academic achievement"). The amicus brief also cited to cases from
other states stating the same. Id. at 37-39.
281. This Part of the relies heavily on an amicus brief the author filed in the Morath/
Edgewood VII case, Brief of Amicus Albert Kauffman on Financial Efficiency Issues,
Williams et al., v. Calhoun Cty. Indep. Sch. Dist., et al. (No. 14-0776) 2015 WL 4779773
[hereinafter Kauffman Amicus Brief]. While the Kauffman Amicus Brief was filed in the
Williams et al., v. Calhoun County Independent School District case, that case was
ultimately restyled as Morath on appeal. Williams et al., v. Calhoun Cty. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
et al., (No. 14-0776) 2015 WL 4779773, sub nom. Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student
Fairness Coalition, et al., 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2016).
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Edgewood II, adopted the following definition of efficiency pertaining to
Texas school finance litigation:
There must be a direct and close correlation between a district's tax
effort and the educational resources available to it; in other words,
districts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues per
pupil at similar levels of tax effort. Children who live in poor districts and children who live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially equal opportunity to have access to educational funds.2 82
Edgewood V supported a district's ability to challenge the maximum
tax rates available under S.B. 7 and set the framework for Edgewood VI,
which significantly expanded and restructured the law in these cases. 2 8 3
Edgewood V also offered a weaker version of its previous financial efficiency test:
As long as efficiency is maintained, it is not unconstitutional for districts to supplement their programs with local funds, even if such
funds are unmatched by state dollars and even if such funds are not
subject to statewide recapture. We caution, however, that the
amount of "supplementation" in the system cannot become so great
that it, in effect, destroys the efficiency of the entire system. The
danger is that what the Legislature today considers to be "supplementation" may tomorrow become necessary to satisfy the constitutional mandate for a general diffusion of knowledge.28 4
In Edgewood VI, the court modified this test by holding the following:
[T]he constitutional standard of efficiency requires substantially
equivalent access to revenue only up to a point, after which a local
community can elect higher taxes to "supplement" and "enrich" its
own schools. That point, of course, although we did not expressly
say so in Edgewood I, is the achievement of an adequate school system as required by the Constitution. Once the Legislature has discharged its duty to provide an adequate school system for the State,
a local district is free to provide enhanced public education opportunities if its residents vote to tax themselves at higher levels. The requirement of efficiency does not preclude local supplementation of
2 85
schools.

282. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491, 498 (Tex. 1991); Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397

(Tex. 1989).
283. Edgewood V, 107 S.W.3d 558, 559 (Tex. 2003).
284. Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
285. Edgewood VI, 176 S.W.3d 746, 791 (Tex. 2005).
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The standards in Edgewood V and Edgewood VI are thus much weaker
and difficult, if not impossible, to enforce.28 6
The confusion generated by the Court's changes in the standard and
approach they applied in the series of school finance cases supports the
argument that the original standards set forth in Edgewood I both conformed better to the demands of the Texas Constitution and were more
jurisprudentially sound.2 87 The basis of the efficiency arguments in the
Edgewood cases is that the state had long created two systems within the
school finance system.2 88 One system created roughly equal access to a
lower level of funding through programs that came to be known as the
"Minimum Foundation Program," the "Foundation School Program," or
the "Tier I and Tier 2 Program".2 89 Conversely, the other system was
funded at a higher level to which districts had access only via their own
tax wealth. 2 90 The access to these funds was perfectly inequitable; in
other words, the system was funded up to the 527-to-i ratio in ability to
raise funds for each penny of tax applied to these tax rates (for which
state matching is not available). 29 1 Even after recapture, wealthier district had easier access to these funds than low-wealth districts, for which
such funds were almost impossible to obtain.2 92
The Texas Supreme Court unanimously rejected the dual system theory
in Edgewood I and Edgewood II, holding that the school finance system
is one system to which all students should have substantially equal access. 293 Yet, the weaker standard the Court adopted in later cases returns Texas to the dual system in which districts have roughly equal
access to some defined level of funding while low-wealth districts continue to have no reasonable access above what is the legislature defines as
an "adequate." 2 9 4
Such a standard is weak because it is based on significantly different
definitions of what is "adequate" and requires the Court to make a
threshold decision on adequacy before determining the financial effi-

286. Kauffman Amicus Brief, supra note 281, at *14.

287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at *13-19.
Id. at *19.
Id.
Id.

291. Id. This ratio is the ratio of the wealth-per-ADA in the wealthiest district to the
wealth-per-ADA in the poorest district, explained in section II of the amicus brief filed by
the Author. Id. at *3-9.
292. Id. at *19. A wealthy district recaptured to $48/WADA (recapture level in Tier
1), after recapture, still generates 16 times more for each penny tax rate than a district that
generates $3/WADA. This assumes that the poorer district does not get a state share at that
tax rate. Id. at *19 n. 38.

293. Id. at *19.
294. Id. at *20.
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ciency of the system. 2 9 5 Using adequacy as a threshold requirement also
gives the legislature unfettered discretion to validate an inefficient system
by redefining the level of education it considers "adequate."296 This is
not merely a theoretical concern. Indeed, during the MorathlEdgewood
VII trial, the legislature and the Texas Education Agency changed the
accountability system that occasionally increased or decreased the academic standards for school districts.2 97
Determining the efficiency of funding for facilities is even more difficult due to the differences between the quality and needs of facilities in
each district-including the fact that certain districts are experiencing
rapidly increasing student counts. 2 98 A financing system that requires
substantially equal access to funds will necessarily require the legislature
and the courts to include funding for facilities as an integral part of the
system.2 99
Although facilities are an integral part of the school system, the Court
refuses to as much. 3" The tests in Edgewood V, Edgewood VI and
MorathlEdgewood VII do not explicitly require that substantially equal
access be at "similar levels of tax effort."30 1 As such, the jurisprudential
weakness of the new standard is more difficult to define and to determine. It would be easier for the legislature, the public, and ultimately the
Court, to determine substantially equal access to available funding than
to determine what constitutes "adequate" before determining what constitutes "substantially equal access." 3 02
VII.

CONCLUSION: A RECOMMENDATION

This Article recommends a thought experiment: What if the legislature
designed a school finance system that gave previously poor and underfunded districts access to 20%-40% more funds than the wealthy districts? Under the MorathlEdgewood VII test, this system would certainly
be upheld because it would be based on the same set of state statutes and
regulations upon which that decision was based. And, of course, the
wealthy districts could not complain because there is no proof that additional funds leads to better educational quality. If you put the Morath/

295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. The state chooses the measurements of accountability and sets the passing
scores and percent of passing requirements. Id.
298. Id. at *20-21.

299. Id. at *21.
300. Id. at *21.
301. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989); Kauffman Amicus Brief, supra
note 281, at *21.
302. Kauffman Amicus Brief, supra note 281, at *21.
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Edgewood VII standard into that scenario, you can imagine the reaction
from those so long benefitted by the vagaries of Texas school finance
jurisprudence.
I recommend a standard that all students in all districts have the same
access to resources at any tax rate available in the state school finance
system. Moreover, the system must account for all the special costs of
students and districts in biennially reviewed cost studies, which many
state district courts and supreme courts have approved. The "science" in
this area has continued to improve and studies, like those reviewed by the
court appointed masters in the New York adequacy litigation, 3 0 3 are particularly instructive, documented, and reviewed in detail by appellate
courts. In addition, Texas must update the weights applied to the major
subpopulations in the school finance area, specifically ELL, economically
disadvantaged students, and students in special education programs.
This would treat all students and all taxpayers equally. It is also a significantly easier standard to understand and apply. Beyond that, it fulfills
the promises of our Texas Constitution and our moral obligations to meet
the needs of our students. As Judge McCown said regarding Edgewood
3
II, "they are all our children."o
1

303. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 801 N.E.2d 326, 332-344 (N.Y. 2003)
(analyzing expert testimony and studies on the "inputs" children receive-teaching, facilities, and instrumentalities of learning-and their resulting "outputs" such as test results and
graduation and dropout rates, to determine whether New York schools delivered a sound
basic education, and to establish a causal link between increased funding and increased
educational opportunity).
304. Recent newspaper studies and hearings in the Texas legislature have disclosed an
arbitrary limit on percentage of students in districts who may be identified in need of special education services. This artificially decreases the state share of school funding and
tragically disserves students in need of special education funding. Bill Zeeble, Texas May
Be Denying Tens of Thousands of Children Special Education, NPR (Oct. 21, 2016, 4:59
AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/10/21/496943376/texas-may-be-denying-tens-ofthousands-of-children-special-education [https://perma.cc/2V9W-MHTV].
305. Barry Siegel, ParentsGet a Lesson in Equality: In A Case Study for Other States,
Texans Are Intently Watching the Courts Try to Share the Wealth Among Public Schools.
They're Also Watching the Politicians Do Nothing, L.A. TiMEs (Apr. 13, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-13/news/mn-143_1-public-school-finance/2 [https://perma.cc/LR2

8-XUYQ].

